



National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association

# 2022 Annual Meeting & Expo

November 1-3, Atlanta, GA

HECM / HMBS and Proprietary Product

Current State of the Secondary Capital  
Markets





# HMBS and Proprietary Product Comparison

## Proprietary Product Summary

- ❖ Self-insured – remaining equity in the home is the insurance
- ❖ All else equal, for a given age cohort, LTV < PLF
- ❖ Issuers have accumulation risk, HMBS issuers less so
  - ✓ Rising rates: fixed rate loans originated early are worth less
  - ✓ Capital markets: may not function, eliminating securitization entirely
  - ✓ Losses: defaults can occur early
  - ✓ Liquidity: volume slowdown leaves insufficient pool size to securitize



# HMBS and Proprietary Product Comparison

## Proprietary Product Investor Risk Overview

- ❖ Crossover loss – unlike HMBS, investors can be hurt by loan level losses
- ❖ Interest rate risk
  - ✓ Rising rates make older fixed rate loans worth less
  - ✓ For ARMs, reset “lag” and caps lower values
- ❖ Prepayment risk – loans paying faster than expected can reduce returns
- ❖ Liquidity – small securitization size limits ability to trade securities



# HMBS and Proprietary Product Comparison

## HECM and HMBS Summary

- ❖ FHA insurance allows more proceeds to borrowers
- ❖ Ginnie Mae's P&I guaranty gives HMBS securities implied AAA rating
- ❖ HMBS issuer accumulation risk less material because HECMs originations are mostly adjustable rate and issue size is much smaller
- ❖ HMBS investors have no crossover loss exposure but do have interest rate risk in a rising rate environment where caps and adjustment frequency cause “lag” in weighted average coupons
- ❖ Mostly, HMBS investors have exposure to prepayment risk



# HMBS and Proprietary Product Comparison

## HMBS Investor Risk Overview

- ❖ Prepayment exposure is significant because securities sell at prices greater than Par
- ❖ When investor returns are calculated, both interest rate and “premium” return of principal paid over Par are used
- ❖ For premium securities, faster than expected prepayments lowers yield
- ❖ The sudden drop in interest rates and corresponding increase in refinance activity since 2020 has dramatically increased prepayment speeds, lowering returns to investors



# Proprietary Product Timeline

Originators have “accumulation risk” due to the following:

- ❖ Loans are inventoried until critical mass is reached for securitization
- ❖ In a rising rate environment, loans originated early worth less than newer loans with higher interest rates
- ❖ Remaining home equity falls faster with rising rates, unless LTVs are adjusted down
- ❖ Loans originated in falling HPA have less equity available as “insurance”
- ❖ Changes in capital markets sentiment prior to securitization
- ❖ Warehouse lenders impose annual, other limits on accumulation



# Proprietary Product Timeline

## Minimum Securitization Size

- ❖ \$300 million is recommended minimum to create sufficient liquidity for investors, and to spread out fixed costs
- ❖ Over the last two+ years, proprietary product securitizations have been ~\$200 million
- ❖ Of late, size has fallen to \$150 million, as issuers work to minimize accumulation risk, and tailor securities to specific investor needs



# Proprietary Product Timeline

Investors face many of the same risks:

- ❖ For fixed rate securities, rising rates lower values
- ❖ For adjustable-rate loans, as rates rise, risk of crossover loss increases from faster interest accretion
- ❖ Adjustable-rate loans and securities also have exposure to interest rate "lag" from caps and reset frequency
- ❖ In a falling HPA environment, lower remaining equity increases risk of crossover loss





# Proprietary Product Securitization





# Proprietary Product Securitization

- ❖ Because RMs don't typically pay interest, investors rely on payoffs to receive return of principal and interest
- ❖ When securitizations are structured, certain prepayment speeds are assumed to calculate investor returns
- ❖ Speeds outside of these assumptions affect overall investor returns
- ❖ If prepayments are greater than expected, less time to build overcollateralization puts lower rated securities at risk to receive full return of principal and interest



# Proprietary Product Current State

- ❖ Price (re)discovery underway
- ❖ Investors have lost confidence in current securitization structures and “predictive” performance of reverse mortgages
- ❖ Retreating yields, nervous investors, and falling volume all hurting proprietary product securitization



# HMBS and HREMIC Securitization Timeline

## HMBS and HREMIC Securitization

- ❖ HMBS does not have material minimum size requirements
- ❖ Ginnie Mae guaranty creates sufficient liquidity for trading
- ❖ HMBS pools are created and sold through Broker/Dealers
- ❖ Broker/Dealers re-securitize HMBS into 2-class HREMIC securities, to better align cashflow performance with investor needs
- ❖ Typically structured into "Par Floaters" and "Interest Only (IO)" Securities



# HMBS and HREMIC Securitization Structure





# Impact of Interest Rates on HECM and HMBS

- ❖ Stable interest rates always create most favorable lending conditions
- ❖ Rising interest rates leave investors with lower-than-market returns
  - ✓ Rising rates also lower PLFs to borrowers
  - ✓ Prepayments slow down, somewhat offsetting the impact of rates
- ❖ Falling interest rates increase prepayment speeds as borrowers have opportunity to refinance, hurting investor returns
  - ✓ Falling interest rates increase PLFs to borrowers

# HMBS and HREMIC Prepayment Change

Pre - 2020



2020 → Current





# HMBS and HREMIC Current State

## Prepayments Have Been the Story

- ❖ At all-time highs, and outside historical bands for 2+ years
- ❖ Investors have lost confidence in the “predictive” prepayment story reverse mortgages used to enjoy
- ❖ Rising rates are slowing prepayments, but yields are falling
- ❖ Investors fear any drop in interest rates could spark new round of refinance activity
- ❖ Investors reluctant to pay premiums our industry became accustomed to



